Showing posts with label Opinion - International Affairs Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Opinion - International Affairs Iran. Show all posts

Thursday, 5 March 2026

International affairs - regime change rarely works

 

Does regime change ever work? History tells us long‑term consequences are often disastrous

Matt Fitzpatrick, Flinders University

The latest US-Israeli bombings in Iran differ from last year’s, because one of the stated aims this time is regime change.

Engaged in the mass murder of civilians at home and fomenting violence abroad, the current Iranian regime has few friends internationally.

Many would be glad to see Iran undergo a far-reaching program of political reform. For many in the Iranian diaspora, regime change imposed from outside is better than none.

But the historical record of imposed regime change, particularly as undertaken by the United States, is patchy at best.

Things rarely go to plan, and the long-term consequences are often disastrous.

Afghanistan and Iraq

Some immediate examples spring to mind.

Still fresh in the public mind would be the shocking scenes of desperate Afghans trying to leave Kabul in 2021 as the United States conceded it could not permanently defeat the Taliban.

This admission came after two decades, thousands of deaths of US and allied troops and tens of thousands of Afghan deaths.

Many would also remember then-US President George W. Bush’s disastrous speech in May 2003 about America’s regime change efforts in Iraq, begun in March that year. Here, Bush addressed the press while standing in front of a huge banner that said “Mission Accomplished”; the implication was regime change had been achieved in just a few months.

In fact, what followed was another decade of US fighting to try to stabilise Iraq, with actions arguably not wound up until 2018 or even beyond.

Once again this came at a huge cost to civilian lives, with The Lancet estimating as early as 2004 that around 100,000 “excess deaths” had occurred as a result of the US attempt to effect regime change there.

Thereafter, Iraq was continuously wracked by violence and civil war. Notably, ISIS took advantage of its weakened state to establish its “caliphate” on Iraqi territory, leading to yet another wave of US intervention.

But US attempts to impose regime change have a much longer and equally unsuccessful history, as well.

From the Bay of Pigs to Iran

The phrase “Bay of Pigs” has become a synonym for the inability to overthrow a government.

Aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro in Cuba in April 1961, not only was then-US President John F. Kennedy’s foray into regime change unsuccessful (Castro died in his sleep with his regime still in control of Cuba at the age of 90 in 2016), it also led to the execution of CIA operatives there.

The US also faced the embarrassment of having to swap tractors for the freedom of the Cuban exiles who had carried out the failed invasion for them.

In 1953, the US and Britain actually did succeed in overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq after he’d announced Iran’s oil industry would be nationalised in response to Western oil companies’ intransigence on royalties and control.

This regime change effort by the US did “succeed” in the short run, but it led to a series of events that culminated in the repressive regime the US aims to replace today.

Mossadeq’s toppling led to the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, becoming an absolutist monarch in the cruellest tradition.

His savage repression led in no small way to the 1979 Iranian revolution, which became the vehicle for the present theocratic government to come to power.

It is one of the ironies of history that the son of the dictatorial shah is now presenting himself as the logical candidate to bring democracy to a new Iran.

From the colonial era to WWII

Some might reach further back and argue regime change in Germany worked after the second world war.

It is worth remembering, however, that this was far from a simple process. It involved occupying Germany for more than a generation, decades of trials against ex-Nazis and splitting the country in two for more than 40 years.

As the epicentre of the Cold War, this is hardly an experiment in regime change that could be easily replicated.

Earlier examples of regime change from the colonial period provide similar lessons.

Large armies of invading colonial forces were able to pull down governments in Africa and Asia and prop up unpopular ones.

But once the occupying forces sought to remove their militaries or lost the will to resort to massacres to reinforce their rule, the shift towards decolonisation or self-rule became increasingly irresistible.

In the Dutch East Indies, French-ruled Vietnam, British India and the Belgian Congo, governments imposed by external powers were rarely viable once the threat of force was removed.

Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring protests in 1968 – an effort to throw off Soviet-imposed rule – were quickly crushed by the USSR, showing once again that regime change “works” for as long as you are prepared to enforce it with violence.

By 1989, however, the Soviet Union’s appetite for enforcing its hegemony across eastern Europe had waned, leading to a largely peaceful transition to democracy across the region.

A failure to learn from history

Today’s US leaders are unlikely to accept the counsel of history.

But they would do well to remember the simple message of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule for attempts to overthrow governments: you break it, you own it.

At present, however, the view from Washington seems to be that you can just break states and hope someone else will fix it for you.The Conversation

Matt Fitzpatrick, Professor in International History, Flinders University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Wednesday, 18 June 2025

Iran - background

Regime change wouldn’t likely bring democracy to Iran. A more threatening force could fill the vacuum

Andrew Thomas, Deakin University

The timing and targets of Israel’s attacks on Iran tell us that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s short-term goal is to damage Iran’s nuclear facilities in order to severely diminish its weapons program.

But Netanyahu has made clear another goal: he said the war with Iran “could certainly” lead to regime change in the Islamic republic.

These comments came after an Israeli plan to assassinate the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reportedly rebuffed by United States President Donald Trump.

It’s no secret Israel has wanted to see the current government of Iran fall for some time, as have many government officials in the US.

But what would things look like if the government did topple?

How is power wielded in today’s Iran?

Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic and authoritarian elements to its governing structure.

The founding figure of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law.

As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive and judiciary.

Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president (currently Masoud Pezeshkian). There are regular elections for both.

But while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice it is a “closed loop” that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top.

Khamenei has been in power for more than 35 years, taking office following Khomeini’s death in 1989. The former president of Iran, he was chosen to become supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of Islamic jurists.

While members of the assembly are elected by the public, candidates must be vetted by the powerful 12-member Guardian Council (also known as the Constitutional Council). Half of this body is selected by the supreme leader, while the other half is approved by the Majles.

The council also has the power to vet all candidates for president and the parliament.

In last year’s elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many candidates from running for president, as well as the Majles and Assembly of Experts, including the moderate former president Hassan Rouhani.

As such, the supreme leader is increasingly facing a crisis of legitimacy with the public. Elections routinely have low turnout. Even with a reformist presidential candidate in last year’s field – the eventual winner, Masoud Pezeshkian – turnout was below 40% in the first round.

Freedom House gives Iran a global freedom score of just 11 out of 100.

The supreme leader also directly appoints the leaders in key governance structures, such as the judiciary, the armed forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The all-powerful IRGC

So, Iran is far from a democracy. But the idea that regime change would lead to a full democracy that is aligned with Israel and the US is very unlikely.

Iranian politics is extremely factional. Ideological factions, such as the reformists, moderates and conservatives, often disagree vehemently on key policy areas. They also jockey for influence with the supreme leader and the rest of the clerical elite. None of these factions is particularly friendly with the US, and especially not Israel.

There are also institutional factions. The most powerful group in the country is the clerical elite, led by the supreme leader. The next most powerful faction would be the IRGC.

Originally formed as a kind of personal guard for the supreme leader, the IRGC’s fighting strength now rivals that of the regular army.

The IRGC is extremely hardline politically. At times, the IRGC’s influence domestically has outstripped that of presidents, exerting significant pressure on their policies. The guard only vocally supports presidents in lockstep with Islamic revolutionary doctrine.

In addition to its control over military hardware and its political influence, the guard is also entwined with the Iranian economy.

The IRGC is heavily enriched by the status quo, with some describing it as a “kleptocratic” institution. IRGC officials are often awarded state contracts, and are allegedly involved in managing the “black economy” used to evade sanctions.

Given all of this, the IRGC would be the most likely political institution to take control of Iran if the clerical elite were removed from power.

In peacetime, the general consensus is the IRGC would not have the resources to orchestrate a coup if the supreme leader died. But in a time of war against a clear enemy, things could be different.

Possible scenarios post-Khamenei

So, what might happen if Israel were to assassinate the supreme leader?

One scenario would be a martial law state led by the IRGC, formed at least in the short term for the purposes of protecting the revolution.

In the unlikely event the entire clerical leadership is decimated, the IRGC could attempt to reform the Assembly of Experts and choose a new supreme leader itself, perhaps even supporting Khamenei’s son’s candidacy.

Needless to say, this outcome would not lead to a state more friendly to Israel or the US. In fact, it could potentially empower a faction that has long argued for a more militant response to both.

Another scenario is a popular uprising. Netanyahu certainly seems to think this is possible, saying in an interview in recent days:

The decision to act, to rise up this time, is the decision of the Iranian people.

Indeed, many Iranians have long been disillusioned with their government – even with more moderate and reformist elements within it. Mass protests have broken out several times in recent decades – most recently in 2022despite heavy retaliation from law enforcement.

We’ve seen enough revolutions to know this is possible – after all, modern Iran was formed out of one. But once again, new political leadership being more friendly to Israel and the West is not a foregone conclusion.

It is possible for Iranians to hold contempt in their hearts for both their leaders and the foreign powers that would upend their lives.The Conversation

Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Friday, 7 August 2009

Who's Your Momma? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues on in Iran

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (pictured at left, the short man) was sworn-in as Iranian president this week with the continuing cloud of the disputed elections still overshadowing his alleged election. Against the backdrop of a divided clerical establishment in Iran, widespread dissatisfaction in the Iranian population and powerful figures in Iran's political elite challenging his position (particularly former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi), Ahmadinejad continues on.The question which arises is how long can Iran continue with the policies of the current president which are more provocative than constructive.
With a poor economic outlook, a suspect nuclear weapons policy and a repressive regime which discourages debate, Iran remains a disadvantaged nation and almost a pariah internationally. Iranian politics is tough and full of complexity with a myriad of interlocking bodies, interests (both religious and secular) and key figures yet increasingly most of these groups are finding common ground in their mutual concern with and distrust of, the Iranian president.

Tuesday, 23 June 2009

When is a vote worth more than one? Update


News this week that Iran's most powerful oversight council has announced on Monday that the number of votes recorded in 50 cities exceeded the number of eligible voters there by three million has further tarnished the 2009 presidential election. This controversy has set off a sustained challenge to Iran’s leadership for the first time in 30 years. The current Government has claimed the voting discrepancy has not affected the overall result however it would be hard for Iranian voters to have any confidence that the electoral system has been fair and truly reflected voter intent. Crackdowns by police and militia are unlikely to change perceptions either within or outside of Iran concerning the invalid nature of the presidential poll. It remains to be seen how far either side of the debate will venture however Iran's security structure is formidable and has already demonstrated the willingness to use lethal force against its own citizens.