Russia and war with the Ukraine - Putin's Pronouncement

 Vladimir Putin - Shutterstock

 
Like an old-style Soviet autocrat, former KGB Lieutenant-Colonel and long serving president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin has initiated the war with the Ukraine. The decision was made solely by Putin without just cause and seemingly not supported by the Russian people at large. A largely symbolic vote by the Russian Parliament (the Duma) to recognise the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk did not include authorising war against the Ukraine. Significant and large protests across Russian cities and towns bear witness to the opposition to Putin's war.

Putin has variously been described in the media as madman, delusional, various other colourful descriptions and compared to either Hitler or Stalin. This reaction however largely obscures the informed analysis of his views provided by foreign affairs commentators and Russian political analysts. The fundamental core of Putin's decision remains his oft-stated view of what Russia lost with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. He has always maintained that this event was a disaster and as a consequence he has sought to seemingly reverse the loss of prestige, territory, power and influence for Russia. This is largely at the expense of countries within Russia's historical sphere of influence and is very much the perspective of a former KGB officer.

Putin's views were again clearly demonstrated in the recorded meeting of Russia's Security Council on 22 February 2022. At this staged meeting, Putin commented on the Russian empire (whatever that is) and variously claimed the Ukraine was a colony with a puppet regime, was created by Lenin, was acquiring nuclear weapons and that the Russian and Ukrainian were actually one people and hence it should not exist. Putin has also commented that he does not want countries that join NATO to be the immediate neighbours to Russia itself.

Even Putin's intelligence chief and long term associate from the KGB days, Sergei Natyshkin was left stumbling and unsure what to say as Putin insisted he provide a full endorsement of the direction being taken. 

Putin operates with a flawed understanding of what action other countries may take. He has probably estimated that -

• NATO is unlikely to directly confront Russia and it will not fight for the Ukraine.
• Western sanctions can be weathered and have been factored into his calculations on the risks for  Russia in this conflict
• Russia has prepared for this war with modernising its Armed Forces and building significant foreign reserves to enable some level of protection from Western sanctions.

Within Russia's own intelligentsia and military commentators, there is little actual concern about NATO and the perceived threat which Putin alludes to. This is Putin's war with at worst only vague support amongst the Russian people and at best, the FSB (the successor organisation to the KGB), the breakaway provinces and senior officers in the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. It is however hard to measure given the level of suppression of any public opinion in Russia.

Russia's military capability - the New Look and the Ukraine

Russian light armoured vehicles - Belarus - Shutterstock

With the ongoing invasion of the Ukraine by Russia at the instigation of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, much public commentary has focussed rightly on the unequal scale of advantage that the Russian military possess compared to their Ukrainian counterparts. This comparison is fully justified as the Russian forces both numerically outnumber the Ukrainians and also technologically, but notably not in all forms of weaponry.

Russia has been upgrading its Armed Forces for many years commencing from 2008 not in respect of the Ukraine, but generally due to the wide range of legacy systems from the Soviet era and also the quite poor performance of several parts of the Russian military in the Georgian conflict that year. Following the end of the conflict, then chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov decided that a massive overhaul was needed and this program became known as the "New Look".

This initiative included a complete change in the Russian Federation Armed Forces military structure that had barely altered since the period of the Soviet Union. The new structure is more versatile, mobile and tailored to operational requirements with no reliance on mass mobilisation that was a feature of the Soviet era. The process of the New Look has been progressing through the State Armament Program 2011-2020 and has been a very long term objective.

The Russians have benefitted from combat experience and systems testing through conflicts in Syria, the Crimea, Georgia and covert operations in eastern Ukraine with the breakaway provinces.  A brief summary of key changes in the Russian military is listed below -

Army/ground forces

• Smaller combat units have been created termed Battalion Tactical Groups or BTGs, usually a battalion of infantry or armour reinforced with additional armour or infantry units with artillery, air defence and electronic warfare.
• Tank modernisation has predominantly been upgrading existing T-72 tanks but progress has been slow and new generation battle tanks such as the T-14 and T-15 IFV are still being tested in trials. Armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles are mainly legacy vehicles of the past and new-generation equipment is not widely available.
• Missile and rocket artillery is where significant change has occured (this is a favoured munition of the Russians stretching back to to World War II). A new 500 kilometre-range missile termed the 9K720 Iskander has replaced the 120 km-range Tochka-U. The Iskander can utilize both ballistic and cruise missiles. The existing BM-30 Smerch multiple rockets launcher system (often seen in media film footage) has been modernised  with new systems.
• There is a strong emphasis on air-portable equipment which is a key reason why the Russians have been focussing on capturing airfields in the Ukraine.

Navy

• The Navy appears to have undergone the most transformation despite a shipbuilding industry that actually performs well below its declared objectives. Sanctions has played an important role in limiting Russia's ship building industry to deliver effective transformation in naval assets.
• The two most significant changes are first, the deployment of the 3M14 Kalibr long-range precision land attack cruise missile on both surface vessels and submarines in the fleet. Land based infrastructure is vulnerable to this form of weapon launched from the sea. Second, the deployment of vessels such as the Karakut corvettes and improved Kilo submarines has strengthened Russian fleet assets with the capability to use Kalibr.  

Air force/Aerospace

• Known for poor performance in Georgia, this part of the Russian Armed Forces has been a focus for improvement. The single role fighter aircraft ( Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum) have been replaced by multi-role fighter ground attack aircraft such as the Su-35S Flanker M, Su-30SM Flanker H and the SU-34 Fulback. 
• Air-to air missiles (or AAMs) are being upgraded with improved short, medium and long range AAMs being deployed that can be launched from bomber aircraft. The emphasis is on stand-off, long-range land attack missiles.
• Tactical air-to-surface missiles mainly with Soviet era designs remain a very slow process with newer designs yet to be deployed in any measurable number.

The Ukraine in comparison has little to no capability in upgrading its weapon systems, developing and/or deploying new ones to provide counterpoints to the Russian inventory.