International affairs - regime change rarely works

 

Does regime change ever work? History tells us long‑term consequences are often disastrous

Matt Fitzpatrick, Flinders University

The latest US-Israeli bombings in Iran differ from last year’s, because one of the stated aims this time is regime change.

Engaged in the mass murder of civilians at home and fomenting violence abroad, the current Iranian regime has few friends internationally.

Many would be glad to see Iran undergo a far-reaching program of political reform. For many in the Iranian diaspora, regime change imposed from outside is better than none.

But the historical record of imposed regime change, particularly as undertaken by the United States, is patchy at best.

Things rarely go to plan, and the long-term consequences are often disastrous.

Afghanistan and Iraq

Some immediate examples spring to mind.

Still fresh in the public mind would be the shocking scenes of desperate Afghans trying to leave Kabul in 2021 as the United States conceded it could not permanently defeat the Taliban.

This admission came after two decades, thousands of deaths of US and allied troops and tens of thousands of Afghan deaths.

Many would also remember then-US President George W. Bush’s disastrous speech in May 2003 about America’s regime change efforts in Iraq, begun in March that year. Here, Bush addressed the press while standing in front of a huge banner that said “Mission Accomplished”; the implication was regime change had been achieved in just a few months.

In fact, what followed was another decade of US fighting to try to stabilise Iraq, with actions arguably not wound up until 2018 or even beyond.

Once again this came at a huge cost to civilian lives, with The Lancet estimating as early as 2004 that around 100,000 “excess deaths” had occurred as a result of the US attempt to effect regime change there.

Thereafter, Iraq was continuously wracked by violence and civil war. Notably, ISIS took advantage of its weakened state to establish its “caliphate” on Iraqi territory, leading to yet another wave of US intervention.

But US attempts to impose regime change have a much longer and equally unsuccessful history, as well.

From the Bay of Pigs to Iran

The phrase “Bay of Pigs” has become a synonym for the inability to overthrow a government.

Aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro in Cuba in April 1961, not only was then-US President John F. Kennedy’s foray into regime change unsuccessful (Castro died in his sleep with his regime still in control of Cuba at the age of 90 in 2016), it also led to the execution of CIA operatives there.

The US also faced the embarrassment of having to swap tractors for the freedom of the Cuban exiles who had carried out the failed invasion for them.

In 1953, the US and Britain actually did succeed in overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq after he’d announced Iran’s oil industry would be nationalised in response to Western oil companies’ intransigence on royalties and control.

This regime change effort by the US did “succeed” in the short run, but it led to a series of events that culminated in the repressive regime the US aims to replace today.

Mossadeq’s toppling led to the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, becoming an absolutist monarch in the cruellest tradition.

His savage repression led in no small way to the 1979 Iranian revolution, which became the vehicle for the present theocratic government to come to power.

It is one of the ironies of history that the son of the dictatorial shah is now presenting himself as the logical candidate to bring democracy to a new Iran.

From the colonial era to WWII

Some might reach further back and argue regime change in Germany worked after the second world war.

It is worth remembering, however, that this was far from a simple process. It involved occupying Germany for more than a generation, decades of trials against ex-Nazis and splitting the country in two for more than 40 years.

As the epicentre of the Cold War, this is hardly an experiment in regime change that could be easily replicated.

Earlier examples of regime change from the colonial period provide similar lessons.

Large armies of invading colonial forces were able to pull down governments in Africa and Asia and prop up unpopular ones.

But once the occupying forces sought to remove their militaries or lost the will to resort to massacres to reinforce their rule, the shift towards decolonisation or self-rule became increasingly irresistible.

In the Dutch East Indies, French-ruled Vietnam, British India and the Belgian Congo, governments imposed by external powers were rarely viable once the threat of force was removed.

Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring protests in 1968 – an effort to throw off Soviet-imposed rule – were quickly crushed by the USSR, showing once again that regime change “works” for as long as you are prepared to enforce it with violence.

By 1989, however, the Soviet Union’s appetite for enforcing its hegemony across eastern Europe had waned, leading to a largely peaceful transition to democracy across the region.

A failure to learn from history

Today’s US leaders are unlikely to accept the counsel of history.

But they would do well to remember the simple message of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule for attempts to overthrow governments: you break it, you own it.

At present, however, the view from Washington seems to be that you can just break states and hope someone else will fix it for you.

Matt Fitzpatrick, Professor in International History, Flinders University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Syria and the collapse of the regime

Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen in Syria. How will this change the Middle East?

Ali Mamouri, Deakin University

The swift and unexpected fall of the Syrian capital, Damascus, to Sunni opposition forces marks a pivotal moment in the modern history of the Middle East.

Bashar al-Assad’s regime had withstood more than a decade of uprisings, civil war and international sanctions since the onset of widespread protests in 2011. Yet, it collapsed in a remarkably short period of time.

This sudden turn of events, with the opposition advancing without significant battles or resistance, has left regional powers scrambling to assess the fallout and its broader implications.

This dramatic development signals a reshuffling of power dynamics in the region. It also raises questions about Syria’s future and the role of its neighbours and global stakeholders in managing the post-Assad landscape.

What does the future hold for Syria?

With the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria now finds itself fragmented and divided among three dominant factions, each with external backers and distinct goals:

1. Syrian opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: These groups, supported by Turkey, now control central Syria, extending from the northern border with Turkey to the southern border with Jordan.

Although they share a common religious identity, the Sunni factions have a history of internal conflicts, which could hinder their ability to form a cohesive government or maintain long-term stability.

The opposition forces range from former jihadists coming from Islamic State and al-Qaeda to secular groups such as the Syrian National Army, which split from Assad’s army after the 2011 uprising.

2. Kurdish forces: The Kurdish groups control territory in northeastern Syria, bordering Turkey in the north and Iraq in the east. They continue to receive support from the United States, which has established military bases in the area. This support risks escalating tensions with Turkey, which views Kurdish empowerment as a threat to its territorial integrity.

3. Alawite forces: Pro-Assad Alawite factions, primarily situated in the coastal regions of western Syria, maintain strong ties with Iran, Iraq and Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group. These areas could serve as a stronghold for remnants of Assad-aligned groups after the opposition’s takeover, perpetuating sectarian divides.

The stark divisions among these groups, combined with the absence of a mutually acceptable mediator, suggest that Syria may now face prolonged instability and conflict.

How will this impact the region?

The swift fall of the Assad regime has profound implications for the major players in the Middle East.

The Sunni rebel forces, with strong Turkish backing, capitalised on a moment of vulnerability in Syria. The Assad regime’s allies were preoccupied — Russia with its ongoing war in Ukraine, and Iran and its proxies with their ongoing conflict with Israel. This provided a strategic opportunity for the rebels to advance swiftly across Syria to the capital, Damascus.

Turkey already effectively controls a strip of territory in northern Syria, where its military has been fighting Syrian Kurdish forces. Now, with the victory of its Syrian opposition allies, Turkey is expected to expand its political and military influence in Syria, causing more challenges for the Kurdish minority fighting for its autonomy.

Israel is also in a strategically better position. The fall of Assad disrupts the so-called “axis of resistance”, comprised of Iran, Syria and Tehran’s proxy groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Iran’s critical military supply lines to Hezbollah will likely be severed, isolating the militant group and likely weakening it even further.

Additionally, the fragmentation of Syria into ethnic and religious factions could diminish the regional focus on Israel, providing space for it to pursue its broader strategic goals. After Israel agreed to a ceasefire with Hezbollah last month, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasised a shift in focus to countering the “Iranian threat”.

Iran, meanwhile, has the most to lose. Assad was a crucial ally in Iran’s regional proxy network. And the collapse of his government follows the significant damage that Israel has already inflicted on its other partners, Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran’s regional influence has now been severely diminished, leaving it more vulnerable to direct conflict with Israel.

The fragmentation of Syria also poses significant security risks to its neighbouring countries – Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Refugee flows, cross-border violence and sectarian tensions are likely to escalate. Turkey is already hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees – many of whom it hopes will return home now that Assad’s government is gone.

For Iraq and Lebanon, this instability could exacerbate their fragile political and economic situations. The Balkanisation of Syria along ethnic and religious lines could encourage other groups in the region to rebel against governments in the pursuit of their own autonomy. This risks entrenching divisions and prolonging conflict across the region.

While many Syrians have celebrated Assad’s fall, it remains to be seen whether their lives will improve much. With the absence of a unified and internationally recognised government in Syria, sanctions are unlikely to be lifted. This will further strain an already devastated Syrian economy, deepening the humanitarian crisis and potentially fuelling extremism.

Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Conflict in 2024

 

Will the world see more wars or unrest in 2024? Here are 5 hotspots to watch

Jessica Genauer, Flinders University

Sadly, 2023 has been a violent one on the global stage. War broke out between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, leading to the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and hundreds of Israelis, including many children on both sides. And the bitter war between Russia and Ukraine continued with no end in sight.

As a result of the focus on these two conflicts, other countries have dropped off the radar for many people. Some of these nations have been dealing with simmering unrest, however, which could erupt in 2024 and seize the global spotlight.

So, where should we be watching in the coming year? Here are five places where I believe civil conflicts or unrest could worsen and potentially lead to violence.

Myanmar

Myanmar descended into chaos in 2021 when a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and sparked widespread civil protests that eventually morphed into an armed resistance.

The country, home to 135 ethnic groups, has rarely known peace. For years before the coup, there was a ongoing, low-grade civil conflict between the military and several minority ethnic groups who have long sought control over natural resources in their regions and independence from the state.

This exploded after the coup as ethnic militia groups joined forces with pro-democracy fighters from the Bamar majority protesting the junta.

Their resistance escalated in late 2023 with a coordinated northern offensive dealing the military its most significant losses in many years.

Insurgents won control of towns and villages on the northeastern border with China, including control over key trade routes. This led to renewed fighting in western Rakhine state, as well as in other areas.

The tenacity of the resistance of these minority groups, paired with the refusal of the military to compromise, suggests the country’s civil war may worsen considerably in 2024 and regain international attention.

Mali

In Mali, a nation in the turbulent Sahel region of Africa, tensions escalated throughout 2023 and now threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war.

Mali has long battled insurgent activity. In 2012, Mali’s government fell in a coup and Tuareg rebels, backed by Islamist militants, seized power in the north.

A United Nations peacekeeping mission was established in 2013 to bring stability to Mali. Then, in 2015, key rebel groups signed a peace agreement with the Mali government.

After two more coups in 2020 and 2021, military officers consolidated their power and said they would restore the state’s full territorial control over all of Mali. The regime insisted the UN peacekeeping mission withdraw from the country, which it did in June 2023. Subsequently, violence broke out between the military and rebel forces over future use of the UN bases.

In November, the military, reportedly backed by Russia’s Wagner Group, took control of the strategic northern town of Kidal which had been held by Tuareg forces since 2012. This undermines the fragile peace that has held since 2015.

It is unlikely the military will regain complete control over all rebel-held areas in the north. At the same time, insurgents are emboldened. With the 2015 peace agreement now all but dead, we can expect increased volatility in 2024.

Lebanon

In 2019, widespread civil protest broke out in Lebanon against leaders who were perceived not to be addressing the day-to-day needs of the population.

The situation continued to deteriorate, with a reshuffled government, escalating economic crisis and a massive port explosion that exposed corrupt practices.

The International Monetary Fund criticised Lebanon in September for a lack of economic reform. The Lebanese government has also failed to reach agreement on appointing a president, a post that has been vacant for more than a year.

This risks undermining the fragile power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon in which the key political posts of prime minister, speaker and president are allocated to a Sunni-Muslim, Shia-Muslim and Christian Maronite, respectively.

Most recently, the war between Israel and Hamas has threatened to spill over to Lebanon, home to the Hezbollah militant group, which claims to have an army of 100,000 fighters. Importantly, this jeopardises tourism as a key hope for Lebanon’s economic recovery.

These factors may precipitate a more serious economic and political collapse in 2024.

Pakistan

Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military has played an interventionist role in politics. Though Pakistani leaders are popularly elected, military officials have at times removed them from power.

In 2022, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan fell out of favour with Pakistan’s militant leaders. He was subsequently ousted from power in a parliament vote and later arrested on charges that his supporters claim are politically motivated.

Violent demonstrations broke out nationwide after his arrest – a display of anger against the military that was once unthinkable.

Pakistan also faces spillover from instability in neighbouring Afghanistan and increased terror attacks. These security challenges have been compounded by a struggling economy and ongoing costs from the devastating 2022 floods.

Pakistan is expected to hold parliamentary elections in February 2024, after which the current military caretaker government is expected to transfer power back to civilian rule. Many are watching the military closely. If this transfer of power does not take place, or there are delays, civil unrest may result.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka faced a debilitating economic crisis in 2022 that led to critical fuel, food and medical shortages. Civil protests caused then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. He was quickly replaced by current President Ranil Wickremesingh.

Stability returned in 2023 as Sri Lanka began implementing economic reforms as part of a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund. However, widespread dissatisfaction with political elites and the underlying drivers of the country’s economic hardship have not been addressed.

Elections are also due in Sri Lanka by late 2024. While Wickremesingh, the incumbent, is likely to run for a second term, he has low trust with the public. He is viewed as too close to corrupt political elites.

This dissatisfaction could lead to renewed protests – particularly if the economy stumbles again – in a repeat of the situation that led to Rajapaksa’s ousting in 2022.

Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.