Showing posts with label Opinion - International Relations - Military - Ukraine War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Opinion - International Relations - Military - Ukraine War. Show all posts

Tuesday, 6 January 2026

Opinion - International Relations - Drones used in the Russia Ukraine War

The Russian - Ukraine war can be best described as a 'drone war' given the advances in technology and tactics that have accured. The guide below provides insight into the variety of drones in use on the battlefield and the advances that have added this lethal new weapon into arsenals.

A visual guide to 14 of the drones wreaking havoc in Ukraine, Russia and beyond

Matt Garrow, The Conversation and Michael Lucy, The Conversation

In the past five years, uncrewed aerial vehicles (drones) have become indispensable in modern warfare. The Russia–Ukraine war has accelerated their ascent: on any given day, there may be hundreds or even thousands of drones operating across the frontlines and behind them.

Cheap, mass-produced consumer technology is the foundation for this growth. Militaries are adapting commercial designs to produce a diverse array of deadly tools.

FPV drones

In sheer numbers, first person view (FPV) drones now dominate the war. Pilots fly them by remote control, sitting in a nearby position and wearing virtual reality goggles to see through the drone’s camera.


FPV drones are very fast, highly manoeuvrable, and often attack by crashing into moving targets and exploding. They are used to strike armoured vehicles, to intercept helicopters and hostile drones, drop anti-personnel mines, and to land near roads and wait to ambush enemy vehicles.

Russia’s main FPV drone is the Molniya-2. Made from plywood, each one can be assembled for less than a thousand dollars using mostly commercial parts, then armed with repurposed mortar or artillery shells.

Russia plans to make two million FPV drones this year.

To avoid radio jamming, Russia has begun controlling these drones via fibre optic cables up to 40 kilometres long. The battlefield is now littered with tens of thousands of very thin fibre optic cables.

FPV drones are also beginning to incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) – at first to assist pilots, and later for greater autonomy.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has so far only engaged with FPV drones by racing commercial devices in multinational competitions.

Multi-copter drones


Multicopters are more general-purpose and easier to operate than FPV drones. They can be used for battlefield reconnaissance, intercepting hostile drones, electronic warfare, GPS jamming, communications relay, delivering packages and dropping small mines or bombs. Many are commercial drones modified with different kits for different missions.

Russia commonly uses small hobbyist quadcopters such as the Chinese-made DJI Mavic 3, the DJI Matrice and the Autel EVO II.


There are also larger purpose-built machines, such as the MiS-150 quadcopter and MiS-35 hexacopter, which can carry payloads up to 15 kilograms. The in-development Buran hexacopter can carry a whopping 80kg.


The ADF operates the R70 Sky Ranger quadcopter for airbase surveillance and defence tasks.

Aircraft-style drones


Winged drones come in two broad groups: one-way (kamikaze or loitering) and reusable.

One‑way drones are used for long‑range strikes against cities, transport and infrastructure. Russia mainly uses the Geran series, which it manufactures in a giant factory 1,000km east of Moscow from designs based on Iran’s Shahed drones.

The medium-sized Geran is most common, used for long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities, transport networks, and civilian and military infrastructure.

By late June 2025, Russia had fired some 29,000 Gerans, and it can now make 2,700 more each month. Simplified versions with no warhead are also used as decoys to distract air defences – not only in Ukraine, but also in Poland and Romania.


The main reusable drones are the Orlan-10 and the ZALA 421. These provide battlespace surveillance and help coordinate artillery and FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian targets.

Orlan-10s are now being also used as motherships carrying and launching smaller FPV drones.

Another reusable drone is the ZALA Lancet, used for both reconnaissance and strike missions. It is a so-called “loitering munition”: it can be launched, stay in the air for some time, identify targets with an onboard camera, and then attack if its human operator commands. More sophisticated than FPV drones, these are also far more expensive.


The ADF operates several reconnaissance drones similar to the Orlan-10: the Shadow Tactical, Wasp AE and Puma AE.

The ADF has also recently purchased some loitering munitions: the Switchblade 300 and OWL.

The ADF also operates the very large Triton maritime surveillance drone, which has no Russian equivalent, and is developing the Ghost Bat, a high-speed drone able to assist fast jet fighter and strike aircraft.


Counter-drones

Counter-drone technology is in high demand. However, drones are small, fast and numerous, which makes it inherently difficult to defend against them in a comprehensive way.

Counter-drone systems include combinations of warning sensors, backpack and vehicle-mounted electronic jammers, gun systems, surface-to-air missiles, laser devices and electromagnetic pulse systems.

FPV and multicopter drones are too small for fighter aircraft to counter them. However, larger aircraft-like drones are more vulnerable. New air-launched rocket systems now allow fighters to shoot down a dozen Gerans during each sortie.

As drones become even more widespread and diverse, the balance between cheap mass-produced attack platforms and effective, adaptable defences will shape the conflicts of the future.

Image credits

Molniya: Militaer Aktuell; Fibre optic drone: АрміяІнформ/Wikimedia; MiS-150: Lamp of Knowledge/YouTube; MiS-35: United24 Media; R70-skyranger: ELP; Geran-2: Scott Peterson/Getty Images; Orlan-10: Mike1979 Russia/Wikimedia; Zala 421: Airforce Technology/JSC Concern; Zala lancet 3: Vitaly V Kuzmin; Puma-3-AE: Naval Technology/Business Wire; Wasp-AE: Sgt. Janine Fabre, Australian Defence. Infographics: Matt Garrow/The Conversation.The Conversation

Matt Garrow, Editorial Web Developer, The Conversation and Michael Lucy, Science Editor, The Conversation

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Saturday, 16 April 2022

Russia - a nation with a history of military conflict

                                    Russian Armed Force Parade Moscow        Shutterstock
The war with Ukraine is bloody, merciless and brutal however it follows a well established path for Russia (or its previous incarnation, The Soviet Union) who has invaded and occupied many of its neighbours repeatedly over the past 200 years. This period spans the Tsarist era to the Russian Federation demonstrating that a change in political institutions has not led to a change in foreign policy. 

It is slightly over 30 years since the Soviet Union controlled vast swathes of Eastern Europe and parts of Northern Central Asia for over half a century or more. Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslavakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the 'Stans' (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) were under direct Soviet control or being governed by puppet Communist regimes. These countries armed forces were integrated into the Warsaw Pact and there were Russian KGB officers stationed or co-located with the respective security services. Belarus still refers to its security police as the KGB. Afghanistan was a late inclusion being invaded in 1979 with the Russians leaving in 1989, the same year as the fall of the Berlin wall (which occured on 9 November 1989).

A short summary of Russian military conflict in the 20th Century from the Communist era onward is provided below. The Russian Civil War and Revolution occured during the period of 1917 to 1922 and much of the conflict involves neighbouring countries seeking independence and freedom from Russia, being successful but later being overtaken again by the Russians. World War I and World War II are excluded from this list due to being global conflicts where Russia was not the aggressor.

The wars -
  • 1917 - 1921: Ukrainian war of independence. Ukrainians defeated and Ukrainian Soviet Sociliast Republic created
  • 1917 - 1920: Kazakhastan campaign and incorporation of Kazakhastan into the Soviet Union
  • 1918: Finish Civil War: Soviets defeated, IFinland independence defended.
  • 1918 - 1920: Latvian War of Independence, Soviets defeated and Latvia gains independence
  • 1918 - 1920: Estonian War of Independence, Soviets defeated and Estonia gains independence
  • 1918 - 1920: Lithuanian - Soviet conflict: Soviets defeated
  • 1918 - 1920: Georgian/Ossetian conflict. Ossetian rebellion for Russia defeated
  • 1919 - 1921: Russian - Polish War. Soviets forced to negotiate at Peace of Riga Treaty. Poland independence gained.
  • 1920: Invasion of Azerbaijan. Soviets win and Azerbaijan Democratic Republic overthrown
  • 1920: Invasion of Armenia: Soviets win and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic established
  • 1921: Invasion of Georgia: Soviets win and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic established
  • 1921 - 1922: Intervention of Russia in conficts in Mongolia and East Karelia uprisings. Soviets win.
  • 1929 - 1930: Soviet army intervention in Afghanistan leads to victory for ally of Russia.
  • 1932: Chechen uprising is redefeated by Soviet army
  • 1939: Soviet Union invades Eastern Poland while Nazi Germany invades Western Poland.Poland defeated and occupied. Later fully controlled by Nazi Germany following commencement of World War II and invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany.
  • 1939: Finland Winter War: Soviet win and Finland cedes territory to Russia.
  • 1944 - 53: Soviet army defeats Nazi German forces and reoccupies Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Partisan movements in Ukraine and Poland defeated and Russia occupies those countries.
  • 1953: East German uprising. Soviets win and uprising suppressed
  • 1956: Hungarian Revolution: Soviets win and revolution crushed
  • 1968: Czechoslovakia invaded by Russia. Soviets occupy Czechoslovakia and remain until 1991
  • 1991 - 1993: Georgian civil war. Soviet success
  • 1994 - 1996: First Chechen War: Soviets defeated
  • 1997 - 1998 Soviet - Afghan war: Russia initially wins but are later forced to leave.
  • 1999- 2009: Second Chechen War: Russia wins and gains control over Chechnya
  • 2008: Georgian War. Russia succeeds and occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia
  • 2014 - present: Ukrainain War
For countries neighbouring Russia's border, independence has always been an academic proposition only. Russia has sought continously to control regions well beyond its borders either directly or through installed governments by Moscow or considered favourably by them.

Saturday, 9 April 2022

Russian military: failures and abuses in the Ukrainian War

Destroyed Russian armour, Bucha, 5 April 2022  Shutterstock
The poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces in the Ukrainian War has surprised military analysts, international commentators and Governments around the world. With an overwhelming supremacy in technology with scale and size in assets, the Russians have not overwhelmed the Ukrainian Army and Air Force as first feared.  Instead a range of clear weaknesses have come to the fore including poor leadership, sloppy planning/logistics, chaotic deployment plus various other underperforming weapons systems.

Amongst the now identified failures -

Ground forces unsupplied and poor communications: armoured vehicles such as heavy battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers have literally run out of fuel and in some cases have been abandoned in the field. Russian soldiers have been seen requesting, appropriating or stealing fuel for their vehicles.

Rations for the troops in the field have been inadequate, lasting only a few days and out-of-date. No effective resupply system is apparent and Russian soldiers have been filmed stealing food and chickens as a result.

Communications have been chaotic with units uncertain of their objectives, their location or even exactly how to communicate with each other. Signals have often been unencrypted and transmissions easily detected by civilians.

Young conscripts with no combat experience have been deployed to the theatre of operations harkening back to another Russian episode being the Chechen War. In that conflict during 1994-96 the Soldiers Mothers Committee was established to bring young poorly trained conscripts back home. 6,500 young conscripts were killed in that war. Will it be the same in Putin's Ukrainian War ?

Air  superiority not achieved: The Ukrainian Air Force consists mainly of old Soviet era fighters such as MIG-29s and SU-27s and with other air assets (close suport, helicopters, transports) only amounts to around 200 aircraft. The Russians in comparison have approx 1,500 combat aircraft alone with modern strike aircraft such as the Su-30, Su-33 and Su-35. The Russians also have long range strategic bombers such as the Tu-22, Tu-95 and Tu-160. Despite this advantage, air superiority has not been achieved.

High tech missile system failures:  despite using cruise missiles and the much vaunted Iskander short range ballistic missiles with a range of around 500 km and accuracy to within 2-5 metres, the missiles have landed short of their targets despite over 300 being fired. The Ukrainian airfields and airforce rather than being destroyed remain viable and able to contest air space.

This is to the benefit of the Ukrainian defence forces which otherwise might have been rendered inert. Instead, with tactical Western support they remain a potent and viable force to defend their country.

A cliche of armed conflicts is that the first casualty of war is always the truth, however there is sufficient independent verification of media and intelligence reports to demonstrate atrocities against civilians have been perpetrated by the Russians and their proxy allies such as the Chechens. This is not  novel and has been a feature of Russian strategy and tactics from the early Soviet era onwards through various conflicts. It remains a stain on the professionalism of the Russian military and only begets a need for revenge from their opponents.