Russia's military capability - the New Look and the Ukraine

Russian light armoured vehicles - Belarus - Shutterstock

With the ongoing invasion of the Ukraine by Russia at the instigation of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, much public commentary has focussed rightly on the unequal scale of advantage that the Russian military possess compared to their Ukrainian counterparts. This comparison is fully justified as the Russian forces both numerically outnumber the Ukrainians and also technologically, but notably not in all forms of weaponry.

Russia has been upgrading its Armed Forces for many years commencing from 2008 not in respect of the Ukraine, but generally due to the wide range of legacy systems from the Soviet era and also the quite poor performance of several parts of the Russian military in the Georgian conflict that year. Following the end of the conflict, then chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov decided that a massive overhaul was needed and this program became known as the "New Look".

This initiative included a complete change in the Russian Federation Armed Forces military structure that had barely altered since the period of the Soviet Union. The new structure is more versatile, mobile and tailored to operational requirements with no reliance on mass mobilisation that was a feature of the Soviet era. The process of the New Look has been progressing through the State Armament Program 2011-2020 and has been a very long term objective.

The Russians have benefitted from combat experience and systems testing through conflicts in Syria, the Crimea, Georgia and covert operations in eastern Ukraine with the breakaway provinces.  A brief summary of key changes in the Russian military is listed below -

Army/ground forces

• Smaller combat units have been created termed Battalion Tactical Groups or BTGs, usually a battalion of infantry or armour reinforced with additional armour or infantry units with artillery, air defence and electronic warfare.
• Tank modernisation has predominantly been upgrading existing T-72 tanks but progress has been slow and new generation battle tanks such as the T-14 and T-15 IFV are still being tested in trials. Armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles are mainly legacy vehicles of the past and new-generation equipment is not widely available.
• Missile and rocket artillery is where significant change has occured (this is a favoured munition of the Russians stretching back to to World War II). A new 500 kilometre-range missile termed the 9K720 Iskander has replaced the 120 km-range Tochka-U. The Iskander can utilize both ballistic and cruise missiles. The existing BM-30 Smerch multiple rockets launcher system (often seen in media film footage) has been modernised  with new systems.
• There is a strong emphasis on air-portable equipment which is a key reason why the Russians have been focussing on capturing airfields in the Ukraine.

Navy

• The Navy appears to have undergone the most transformation despite a shipbuilding industry that actually performs well below its declared objectives. Sanctions has played an important role in limiting Russia's ship building industry to deliver effective transformation in naval assets.
• The two most significant changes are first, the deployment of the 3M14 Kalibr long-range precision land attack cruise missile on both surface vessels and submarines in the fleet. Land based infrastructure is vulnerable to this form of weapon launched from the sea. Second, the deployment of vessels such as the Karakut corvettes and improved Kilo submarines has strengthened Russian fleet assets with the capability to use Kalibr.  

Air force/Aerospace

• Known for poor performance in Georgia, this part of the Russian Armed Forces has been a focus for improvement. The single role fighter aircraft ( Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum) have been replaced by multi-role fighter ground attack aircraft such as the Su-35S Flanker M, Su-30SM Flanker H and the SU-34 Fulback. 
• Air-to air missiles (or AAMs) are being upgraded with improved short, medium and long range AAMs being deployed that can be launched from bomber aircraft. The emphasis is on stand-off, long-range land attack missiles.
• Tactical air-to-surface missiles mainly with Soviet era designs remain a very slow process with newer designs yet to be deployed in any measurable number.

The Ukraine in comparison has little to no capability in upgrading its weapon systems, developing and/or deploying new ones to provide counterpoints to the Russian inventory.