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Destroyed Russian armour, Bucha, 5 April 2022 Shutterstock |
The poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces in the Ukrainian War has surprised military analysts, international commentators and Governments around the world. With an overwhelming supremacy in technology with scale and size in assets, the Russians have not overwhelmed the Ukrainian Army and Air Force as first feared. Instead a range of clear weaknesses have come to the fore including poor leadership, sloppy planning/logistics, chaotic deployment plus various other underperforming weapons systems.
Amongst the now identified failures -
Ground forces unsupplied and poor communications: armoured vehicles such as heavy battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers have literally run out of fuel and in some cases have been abandoned in the field. Russian soldiers have been seen requesting, appropriating or stealing fuel for their vehicles.
Rations for the troops in the field have been inadequate, lasting only a few days and out-of-date. No effective resupply system is apparent and Russian soldiers have been filmed stealing food and chickens as a result.
Communications have been chaotic with units uncertain of their objectives, their location or even exactly how to communicate with each other. Signals have often been unencrypted and transmissions easily detected by civilians.
Young conscripts with no combat experience have been deployed to the theatre of operations harkening back to another Russian episode being the Chechen War. In that conflict during 1994-96 the Soldiers Mothers Committee was established to bring young poorly trained conscripts back home. 6,500 young conscripts were killed in that war. Will it be the same in Putin's Ukrainian War ?
Air superiority not achieved: The Ukrainian Air Force consists mainly of old Soviet era fighters such as MIG-29s and SU-27s and with other air assets (close suport, helicopters, transports) only amounts to around 200 aircraft. The Russians in comparison have approx 1,500 combat aircraft alone with modern strike aircraft such as the Su-30, Su-33 and Su-35. The Russians also have long range strategic bombers such as the Tu-22, Tu-95 and Tu-160. Despite this advantage, air superiority has not been achieved.
High tech missile system failures: despite using cruise missiles and the much vaunted Iskander short range ballistic missiles with a range of around 500 km and accuracy to within 2-5 metres, the missiles have landed short of their targets despite over 300 being fired. The Ukrainian airfields and airforce rather than being destroyed remain viable and able to contest air space.
This is to the benefit of the Ukrainian defence forces which otherwise might have been rendered inert. Instead, with tactical Western support they remain a potent and viable force to defend their country.
A cliche of armed conflicts is that the first casualty of war is always the truth, however there is sufficient independent verification of media and intelligence reports to demonstrate atrocities against civilians have been perpetrated by the Russians and their proxy allies such as the Chechens. This is not novel and has been a feature of Russian strategy and tactics from the early Soviet era onwards through various conflicts. It remains a stain on the professionalism of the Russian military and only begets a need for revenge from their opponents.